Introduction

I must first of all express my deep gratitude to the Review of International Studies for including this wide-ranging forum on Violence and Civilization in the Western States-Systems
(hereafter V&C) in this issue. I am especially grateful to John Hobson for the original idea of organising the exchange and for his towering introduction which deserves a wide readership in its own right as a major reflection on the postcolonial critique of V&C that runs through much of the discussion. 1 All of the contributors deserve my thanks for generously engaging with the book in rigorous and challenging ways and for pressing me to clarify and extend key parts of the argument.
Several of the articles in this exchange argue that the synthesis of process sociology and English School analysis which is at the heart of V&C is guilty of Eurocentrism. The Anglo-American dominated discipline that is constrained by a lack of understanding of, and serious engagement with, some of the best work in Sociology.
On the Processual Analysis of Violence and Civilization
Before proceeding to reply to the critics, it is necessary to comment on the project of which V&C is part and to expose the errors of the interpretation that the book provides 'a linear and progressive narrative' shackled to a 'triumphalist teleology' (Çapan, this issue) and, in 4 addition, to reject the contention that it presumes there was an 'inevitable march towards European modernity' that was driven by an indestructible capacity for 'self-rectification' in the face of violence and suffering (Ling, this issue). V&C is the second part of a threevolume study of 'the problem of harm in world politics' (hereafter PoH), the eponymous title of the first volume which will conclude with a long-term perspective on the relationship between social and political symbols and global 'harm conventions'. 3 The first volume emphasised the tension within recent studies of world history over whether significant changes have taken place outside the technological domain and whether it is possible to identify progressive developments including the widening circle of moral concern between societies (and, more specifically, on whether the history of Western brutality, greed and exploitation have consistently outweighed the West's more 'beneficent and humane' qualities). 4 V&C extends the argument of PoH that the gulf between the two standpoints is not as great as it may initially appear to be.
The process-sociological analysis of European state-formation as discussed in chapter four of PoH and developed in V&C is incompatible with linear, progressive narratives, teleological explanations and faith in historical irreversibility. State-formation and the interrelated development of notions of civility and civilization gave rise to deep tensions within European patterns of social and political development. Modern states amassed extraordinary destructive capabilities that were intertwined with colonial expansion and the global transformation of human societies. The concept of civilization which was a crucial part of the 5 self-consciousness of colonising groups 5 was repeatedly employed to justify nineteenthcentury imperial expansion and colonial violence. But as the sixth and seventh chapters of V&C showed, discourses of civilization were also used to condemn imperial cruelties that were deemed to be incompatible with 'civilized' existence. Criticisms of V&C that were noted at the beginning of this section fail to take account of the ambiguities of the idea of civilization in the history of the modern states-system. The persistence of those ambiguities is evident in how the concept is often deployed in the West to condemn 'barbaric' practices such as the death penalty and to authorise using force against contemporary 'savage' terrorist organisations. V&C relies on process-sociological investigations into changing balances of power between social groups and their world-views in the quest to identify and understand significant trends or directions --or the 'immanent order of change' --in different eras.
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The inquiry therefore broadened the discussion of 'the problem of harm' in human societies or the tensions that exist between pressures to accumulate the instruments of violence to deal with external threats and countervailing imperatives to control violent capabilities whether for self-interested, prudential or moral reasons. 14 V&C explains how modern notions of civilization as well as earlier discourses that encapsulated at least elite beliefs about permissible and forbidden forms of violence developed in the course of the 'scaling up' of social and political organisation. 15 The idea of the ambiguities of civilization was used to analyse changing balances of power between violent capabilities, doctrines that legitimated the use of force, and moral standpoints that were deployed to urge greater controls on violence in intra-and inter-societal relations. As the discussion will show, the focus was on the changing power balances between 'civilizing' and 'decivilizing processes'
in the Western states-systems. V&C identifies limited 'progressions' in international society but it is not a 'progressivist' narrative that trades in the thematics of discredited nineteenthcentury philosophies of history. 16 As Mennell emphasises in the conclusion to his paper, the aim of process-sociological inquiries is to understand the sociogenetic and psychogenetic conditions under which reversible progressions occur. That is why the analysis of V&C is processual but not committed to 'a linear and progressive narrative'.
. (ostensibly a civilization) that was differentiated from 'barbarian' societies has been common to all states-systems. 18 That observation was not linked with a detailed examination of the processes by which different peoples came to identify with the same culture or civilization.
Process sociology and English School Inquiry
There was no discussion of the relationship between international society and 'civilizing processes' at the intra-societal level. The reverse problem exists in Elias's explanation of how 
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Lawson rejects the project of integrating what he describes as incommensurable perspectives in a supposedly higher-level synthesis. In his paper, he contrasts Wight's 'substantialist' approach with Elias's 'relational' perspective on social-scientific inquiry. The contention is that the former has a static, a-historical conception of the common culture which is the supposed sine qua non of an international states-system. The criticism is not decisive as far as synthesising core elements of English School inquiry and process sociology is concerned. Wight's explorations can be reworked to explore the connections between intraand inter-societal 'civilizing processes'. There is no insurmountable barrier to extending the inquiry in that way. However, Lawson's second and more fundamental criticism is that Elias's 'relational' analysis of the European 'civilizing process' fails to provide an adequate foundation for the proposed synthesis. In common with some of the more overtly postcolonial criticisms of V&C in this Forum, he maintains that Elias's inquiry into the rise of European notions of civilization concentrated too narrowly on elite interaction within court societies.
He argues, and this is a correct interpretation of Elias's narrative, that the focus was on how dominant codes of behaviour spread downwards from the higher echelons to the lower strata and outwards to ruling elites in other societies. 22 Lawson's argument is that the analysis ignored the influence of voices 'from below' in shaping Western civilization.
The next section considers the related argument in Lawson's critique, which has strong support from the articles by Go and Ling, that V&C is equally guilty of ignoring or 22 That was the dominant process while power relations were highly uneven, but the lower strata succeeded in extracting major concessions from the ruling elites as more even power balances developed and those elites became more dependent on the members of less powerful groups for the satisfaction of their interests. See Mennell, this issue, on 'power ratios' and 'functional democratisation'. Global equivalents will be considered in the discussion of process sociology and postcolonialism.
13 downplaying the role of non-Western 'agency' in that process. But there is a central point regarding power relations to make in response to Lawson's critique that is also relevant to their postcolonial lines of argumentation. As Elias argued, it is impossible to understand the course of the European 'civilizing process' without first analysing the power asymmetries between the 'established and the outsiders' within the standard-setting societies such as
France -and without investigating the power differentials between elite court circles and the lower strata which they regarded as their natural inferiors. Members of court society did not invite focus groups that drew together representatives from different social groups to assist them in defining 'civil' and 'civilized' conduct. No referendum was ever held -and none was contemplated -to ascertain whether the people at large consented to, or had a preference for exiting, the 'civilizing process'. In the context of highly uneven power balances, the opinion of outsiders scarcely mattered within 'civilized' societies or, as I shall argue in the section on Eurocentrism, in relations with supposedly savage non-European peoples in the colonial era.
Lawson does not stand alone in this Forum in ignoring those crucial power relations when making the case for considering the impact of 'voices from below' on European trajectories of development. The upshot is that the appropriate criticism of Elias's 'relational' analysis of the 'civilizing process' and its globalisation is not that non-Western agency had far greater significance than he realised but that he did not take the emphasis on power inequalities far 
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'superiority' over non-Europeans. Social-scientific examinations of civilization and the 'civilizing process' may therefore arouse the suspicion that they are underpinned by pernicious binaries between 'advanced' and 'backward' peoples (Mennell, this issue).
Analysts may easily fall into a trap of their own making by searching for evidence that seems to support initial preconceptions or prejudices. 40 In fact, process sociology contributes to the critique of 'civilization' by examining in a relatively-detached way -by explicitly eschewing 
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They do not naively assume that the sociological categories that were used to explain the European 'civilizing process' can be applied automatically to the study of non-European counterparts. 44 That is the force of the distinction between Europe-centred and Euro-centric modes of sociological inquiry.
As Hobson argues in his introduction, landing the blow as far as the accusation of Eurocentrism is concerned is more difficult than the critics in this Forum realise. 
25
advanced by a leading process sociologist. The contention is that, with the exception of 'a few passages in On the Process of Civilization, we do not get a very clear sense…that at the very time that civilization was developing in Western Europe, it was busily spreading itself over the whole globe in the most violent of ways, so that it is not unfair to say that the ritualized civility of European court society was built on the blood of murdered "primitives"
and bought with the land, labour and raw materials which marauding Europeans plundered from "their" empires'. 50 The argument continues that, throughout the Eliasian explanation of the state's monopolization of violence, there is surprisingly little discussion 'of what states actually did with that monopoly, in relation to both their own populations and those of the parts of the world they set about colonizing. Elias himself, for example, spoke of the "spread"
of Western civilization, the "transformation of Oriental or African peoples in the direction of
Western standards", and the "integration" of the rest of the world within European standards of behaviour as an essential element of the "civilization of the colonized" in a way which glossed over exactly how violent a process that really was'. 51 To construct a more complex analysis of European civilization, it is maintained, it is essential 'to supplement, systematically, the concept of 'civilizing processes' with that of 'civilizing offensives', to 50 Robert van Krieken, 'The Barbarism of Civilization: Cultural Genocide and the "Stolen paragraph which referred to the relationship between court societies and civilizations, Chong's discussion holds that a 'culture of nobility' exercised constraints on 'untrammelled violence' in relations between interwoven court societies. However, the analysis seems to sail perilously close to cultural reductionism. Questions immediately arise about whether the key concepts used in process-sociological studies of figurations (including power ratios, established-outsider dynamics, modes of stigmatisation, struggles for emancipation and so forth) can be used to explain core dynamics in that region and in other international societies.
Those are issues that the comparative analysis of global 'civilizing processes' needs to examine.
5 Those investigations can be conducted as part of the larger project of forging connections between the study of international systems and world history. 
